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Abstract
According to Pulvermüller (1999), words are represented in the brain by cell assemblies (Hebb, 1949) distributed over diVerent
areas, depending on semantic properties of the word. For example, a word with strong visual associations will be represented by a
cell assembly involving neurons in the visual cortex, while a word suggesting action will selectively activate neurons in the motor
areas. The present work aims to test the latter hypothesis by means of behavioural measures. SpeciWcally it tests the prediction that
there should be a selective inXuence (in terms either of interference or priming) of performed/observed movements on the perfor-
mance (reaction times and accuracy) of lexical decision involving words with a strong action association. Similarly, a selective inXu-
ence of visual images on lexical decision involving words with strong visual associations should be observed. Two experiments were
carried out. Results provided partial support for the hypothesis.
  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
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According to a widely established view, language con-
stitutes a mental module (Chomsky, 1988), largely inde-
pendent of general cognition, where the lexicon acts as a
mental dictionary, with each word corresponding to a
speciWc entry. Each entry contains information about the
word’s meaning, its part of speech, and its relationship
with the other words. This view of language has pro-
duced several models within the classical symbolic
approach, as it readily lends itself to the proposal of theo-
ries involving the rule-governed manipulation of tokens.
The rules invoked are primarily syntactical. The inXuence
of this traditional view, however, extends beyond classical
models, involving also some connectionist approaches.
Even if neural networks are proposed as a more neuro-
logically plausible means of representation, overcoming
the problematic assumption of complex built-in algo-
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connected to each other through associative links of vari-
able strength (e.g., LSA, Landauer & Dumais, 1997). The
idea of semantic memory being represented by nodes,
where activation spreads automatically from one node to
the nearby ones along associative pathways (Collins &
Loftus, 1975), constitutes an accepted theoretical account
of semantic priming (for other accounts, such as back-
ward priming or expectancy generation, see Balota,
1994). Priming is a phenomenon whereby previous expo-
sure to information (the prime), which can be ortho-
graphically, phonologically, or semantically related to the
target, inXuences the speed and/or accuracy of word rec-
ognition processes in various tasks, such as naming or
lexical decision. Within this theoretical framework, facili-
tation of related words and inhibition of unrelated words
are explained in terms of the relative spatial proximity of
the nodes (words) in the semantic network. However, the
model operates at a descriptive, cognitive level, with little
or no connection to the underlying neurological pro-
cesses. Cognitive neuroscience can help shed some light
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beyond the mental dictionary metaphor, providing a
more biologically motivated foundation for priming and
other related issues.
The main inspiration for the present research arose
from two proposals regarding the neurobiological bases
of language, supported by an increasing amount of
empirical Wndings. First is the idea that language areas
seem to have sensorimotor roots. For example, activa-
tion in the Broca’s area is observed either when subjects
perform complex sequences with the hand and Wngers, or
when they observe such movements by another person
(Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998), suggesting that the language
faculty may have arisen as an adaptation of the sensori-
motor system. Second is the concept that cell assemblies
are “possible building blocks of cognition” (Pulvermül-
ler, Preissl, & Carsten, 1994; Reilly, 2001), and that dis-
tributed functional networks underlie all higher
cognitive processes, including language.
According to Hebb (1949), cell assemblies are func-
tional units, comprising neurons that are strongly inter-
connected by excitatory synapses, such that activation of
a subset of the population leads to activation of the
whole assembly in a self-sustaining process. The cell
assembly hypothesis, as proposed by Hebb (1949), is
based on several fundamental postulates. (1) The
strengths of the connections (the synapses) between two
neurons can alter with time: if the pre-synaptic neuron
and the post-synaptic neuron are both active at the same
time, then the strength of the synapse will increase. (2)
The connections between groups of neurons that tend to
Wre together will strengthen (through a process now
known as Hebbian learning), leading to the formation of
strongly associated circuits referred to as cell assemblies.
Applying Hebb’s model to language, (Pulvermüller &
Preissl, 1991; Pulvermüller et al., 1994; Pulvermüller,
1999, 2001) hypothesised that words are represented by
distributed functional neural networks. His crucial con-
tribution is the idea that distributed cell assemblies rep-
resenting words contain, in addition to neurons in the
recognised language areas, also neurons in areas related
to aspects of the words’ meaning (Pulvermüller, 1999). In
fact, during language acquisition ‘neurons related to a
word form become active together with neurons related to
perceptions and actions reXecting aspects of its meaning’
(p. 12). Repeated co-activation of neurons in diVerent
cortical (or even subcortical) areas leads eventually to
the formation of a higher-order assembly, which can be
entirely ignited by the activation of any suYcient part.
Over the years Pulvermüller has successfully tested—
with behavioural, electrophysiological, and metabolic
studies—a number of predictions based on his hypothe-
sis. In particular, in agreement with the idea that assem-
blies constitute the basic units of word representation,
neuronal populations become active when a word is
being processed. Cell assembly ignition will take placeafter presentation of a word but not of a pseudoword,
which will induce only partial—if any—activation. (Pul-
vermüller et al., 1994). Critically, diVerent word catego-
ries are represented by cell assemblies with a diVerent
topography. On the one hand function words, whose
meanings reXect their linguistic use rather than objects
or actions, should be represented exclusively by strongly
left-lateralised assemblies limited to the perisylvian cor-
tices; on the other hand, content words should be repre-
sented by less lateralised assemblies, including neurons
both within and outside the perisylvian regions. Within
content words a further distinction is expected between
‘perception’ and ‘action’ words: vision words, referring
to visual stimuli, should induce additional activation in
the visual areas (occipital and infero-temporal lobes);
action words, referring to movements performable by
one’s own body, should evoke additional activation in
the motor areas (Pulvermüller, 1999).
Developmental (Bates, Bretherton, & Snyder, 1988)
and neuropsychological studies have suggested dissocia-
tion between objects and actions, grounded in diVerent
underlying brain organisations. While models inXuenced
by traditional theories of grammar (e.g., generative
grammar) ascribe the observed diVerences to their
respective syntactic roles (nouns and verbs), Pulvermül-
ler’s work oVers an alternative explanation using neu-
rally based semantic distinctions. Indeed, the distinction
extends beyond lexical boundaries, with nouns associ-
ated with actions behaving like verbs (Pulvermüller,
1999), and verbs with no action association behaving
like nouns (Lu et al., 2002).
Further Wne-grained distinctions can be observed
within each category, for example, with diVerent topog-
raphies for cell assemblies corresponding to leg-, arm-,
and face-related words correlated with the somatotopic
organisation of the motor cortex (Pulvermüller, 2001).
The crucial idea is that, rather than being nodes
within an associative network, words are represented by
cell assemblies, which can overlap to various extents,
depending on their shared meaning. This hypothesis can
provide a more neurobiologically plausible framework
for the explanation of priming-like eVects. If semanti-
cally related words are represented by overlapping
assemblies, then activation of the neural population rep-
resenting a speciWc word equates to the activation of a
subset of the cell assemblies representing semantically
related words. In this way, ignition of the cell assembly
for the target word is facilitated by exposure to a related
prime.
Furthermore, if content words at least involve activa-
tion of the sensorimotor areas representing aspects of
their meaning, then it is worth investigating whether
behaviours other than words (e.g., actions, perceptions,
etc.) have an inXuence on word recognition processes.
Again, if the respective cell assemblies overlap, can a per-
formed/observed action facilitate the recognition of
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diVerent tasks compete for the same neural resources?
In terms of the cell assembly hypothesis, the inXu-
ence,—if any—of action (either perceived or performed)
on action words, of images on vision words, etc., does
not need to be mediated by the verbal label, that is,
actions/images do not require to be named in order for
the inXuence to occur. Rather, the inXuence should be
direct, and depend on recruited overlapping cell assem-
blies. In contrast with the traditional view of priming,
therefore, not only nameable, but also non-nameable
actions should have an inXuence on speed and/or accu-
racy of word recognition.
2. Experiment 1
The following experiment was carried out to investi-
gate the hypothesis that the functional unit of the brain
representing action words is a cell assembly involving
additional neurons in the motor areas (Pulvermüller,
1999).
SpeciWcally, it was aimed at testing the prediction that
there should be a selective inXuence, either in terms of
interference or priming, of performed movements on the
recognition of action words describing the movements,
in contrast to both general action words and pseudo-
words, due to the simultaneous activation of overlap-
ping cell assemblies. Moreover, the expected eVect
should be detectable with behavioural measures, such as
speed and accuracy in performing a lexical decision task.
Two hypotheses were tested. First that movements
performed by hand would have a selective inXuence on
reaction times and errors for lexical decision on words
describing actions performed by hand, as opposed to
general action words or pseudowords. Second, the
“nameability” of actions would also inXuence perfor-
mance, enhancing RTs and/or accuracy as a function of
semantic priming. It was predicted that nameable
actions would speed reactions and reduce errors for
actual action words compared to other word categories.
3. Procedure
Eighteen native English speakers performed lexical
decisions on visually presented words and matched
pseudowords (a global set of 48 stimuli, reported in
Appendix A), of which: 32 English words matched for
length (four letters) and frequency (the words chosen
had a frequency range of 10–191 per million, from Leech
& Rayson, 2001); and 16 pseudowords (PW) matched for
length (four letters), phonologically legal, and derived
from 16 of the actual words by changing only one char-
acter, (e.g., pull ! ‘pule’). The 32 actual words were
verbs strongly associated with action, half of themdescribing actions performable with one’s hand (or hand
action words, HAW; e.g., pull, push, etc.); and half describ-
ing general actions (or general action words, GAW: e.g.,
view, wake, etc).
Following a training session, one of 16 iconic visual
cues (see Fig. 1) appeared in black at the centre of a
white computer screen, indicating that the associated
action was to be performed. Each visual cue was consis-
tently associated with one of 16 simple actions, which
were of two diVerent types: eight actions describable
with a single word (nameable), acting as appropriate
cues for the linked hand action words; eight not describ-
able with a single word (un-nameable), and acting as
inappropriate cues for the linked hand action words.
The cue lasted on the screen for 1000 ms, and was
immediately followed by the appearance of one of the
three linked words (a HAW, a GAW, or a PW; again black
letters on a white background) in place of the symbol.
While still performing the cued action with the left hand,
subjects had to decide whether the stimulus was a real
word or not, clicking with their right hand, respectively,
on the left or the right mouse button. An intervening
stimulus, in the form of a black rectangle at the centre of
the screen, was presented after each lexical decision. To
proceed, the middle mouse button had to be clicked.
This way, subjects could adapt the task completion at
their own pace. Each subject was presented once with the
whole block of 48 words, one at a time, and in random
order.
Reaction times were recorded from the appearance of
the word on the screen to the response. A record was
also kept of subject responses.
The two independent variables, type of word, with
three levels (HAW, GAW, and PW) and nameability of the
action, with two levels (nameable, un-nameable) were
both within subjects. This gave a balanced 3 £ 2 design,
with a total of six combined conditions. Reaction times
and errors for the diVerent levels of the two independent
variables were analysed using a 3 (word type) £ 2 (action
type) ANOVA for repeated measures.
4. Results
4.1. Reaction times
Reaction times for the lexical decision task for each
participant on each trial were recorded. The mean RTs
for the three types of word and the two kinds of action
are displayed in Fig. 2.
Fig. 1. One of the 16 symbols used as cues in Experiment 1. This one
represents the action “pull.”
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type of word (F (2, 34) D 1.946, p > .05), and the interac-
tion between type of word and type of action
(F (2, 34) D 0.724, p > .05) were not signiWcant. However,
the main eVect of type of action (F (1, 17) D 9.857, p < .01)
was signiWcant; slower reaction times resulted when any
kind of word was preceded by an un-nameable action,
rather than a nameable one.
4.2. Errors
The percentage of errors for the lexical decision task
for each participant on each trial was recorded. The
error percentages for the three types of word and the two
kinds of action are shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 2. Reaction times by action type and word type from Experiment 1.
Fig. 3. Percentage of errors in Experiment 1 for HAW, GAW, and PW
presented, respectively, after a nameable and an un-nameable action.A repeated measures ANOVA on the percentage of
errors produced a signiWcant main eVect for type of
word (F (2, 34) D 20.118, p < .01); many more errors were
made for pseudowords than actual words. The main
eVect of nameability of action was signiWcant
(F (1, 17) D 13.714, p < .01); nameable actions produced
more errors. The interaction between type of word and
type of action was also signiWcant (F (2,34) D, p < .01),
with the highest percentage of errors for pseudowords
preceded by nameable actions.
5. Discussion
5.1. Reaction times
According to the Wrst hypothesis, there should be a
diVerential eVect of performed movements on lexical
decision times for diVerent types of words. Although
without reaching statistical signiWcance, results display a
meaningful pattern with the fastest RTs for general
action words, slightly slower for pseudowords and even
slower for hand action words.
The second hypothesis that nameable and un-name-
able actions should have a diVerent inXuence on the
reaction times in the lexical decision task was supported
by the statistical analysis, and the diVerence was highly
signiWcant. This result is open to several interpretations.
The classic explanation would be in terms of semantic
priming: the name given by the subject to the movement
performed acted as a prime for the subsequent word.
However, nameability was found to aVect signiWcantly
reaction times for pseudowords as well. While words
were controlled for frequency, the actions performed
weren’t. It might be the case that nameable actions are
more frequent than un-nameable ones, therefore this
result could be reducible to an action frequency eVect.
The interaction between nameability and type of
action was not statistically signiWcant, suggesting that
nameability inXuenced all the three-presented types of
stimulus in the same way. In fact, there was an increase
in the subjects’ reaction times for both action words and
pseudowords when they were preceded by un-nameable
actions.
One possible explanation is that the process of identi-
fying un-nameable actions from the icons presented on
the screen and then executing the actions might have
proved cognitively more demanding than their nameable
counterparts. So in Fig. 1, we are seeing two eVects, an
overall cognitive load eVect across all action types and
an interference eVect speciWcally aVecting hand actions.
5.2. Errors
In agreement with the Wrst hypothesis that there
should be a diVerential eVect of performed movements
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types of words, many more errors were made for
pseudowords than for actual words (both HAW and GAW).
The second hypothesis that nameable and un-name-
able actions should have a diVerential inXuence on accu-
racy was also supported: fewer mistakes were made for
un-nameable actions compared to nameable actions.
The interaction between the two variables was also
signiWcant with an increase in the percentage of errors
for pseudowords than for words in the nameable condi-
tion.
The result appears consistent with the assumption
that the movement performed (e.g., the action of pulling)
will activate part of the cell assembly (the prefrontal sub-
set) representing the word that describes the action (e.g.,
‘pull’) and the semantically related words. The associ-
ated pseudoword (e.g., ‘pule’) may partially activate the
cell assemblies representing orthographically relatedwords (Pulvermüller et al., 1994). Among the partially
activated words, it will be likely to Wnd the name given to
the action performed (pull). Simultaneous activation of
subsets of the same cell assembly (representing the word
‘pull’), could cross the ignition threshold and lead to
activation of the entire assembly. The expected result
being either a slower decision, to inhibit the wrongly
activated cell assembly or, alternatively, more errors:
pseudowords will be more easily judged as real words
when accompanied by nameable movements (see Fig. 4).
The latter is exactly the result observed: the perfor-
mance of subject for pseudowords accompanied by
nameable movements was less accurate. The string ‘snir,’
in particular, was systematically misjudged as a word by
all the 18 subjects tested when accompanied by the
action of stirring.
In summary, the results of Experiment 1 are equivocal
with respect to the possibility of direct priming of wordsFig. 4. An ‘inappropriate’ pseudoword following a performed action is correctly judged as a non-word, as it fails to activate any word cell assembly
(A); an ‘appropriate’ pseudoword (e.g., pule), however, can lead to ignition of the cell assembly corresponding to the related word (pull), and there-
fore be misjudged as a real word (B).
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actions signiWcantly inXuence lexical decisions on seman-
tically related words, but the eVect is primarily one of
interference, with un-nameable non-cueing actions
increasing overall reaction times, and also having an
especially large eVect on hand action words. The interpre-
tation of these data is also complicated by the fact that
the task of icon interpretation may have placed an addi-
tional cognitive burden on the subjects and obscured
some early onset cell assembly activation eVects.
6. Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to address a number of
shortcomings in the preceding experiment. The most
important one being the confound between appropriate-
ness and nameability; in Experiment 1, nameable actions
always acted on hand action words and the matching
pseudowords as appropriate cues, while un-nameable
actions always acted on hand action words and the
matching pseudowords as inappropriate cues. This is for
the obvious reason that there could never be, by deWni-
tion, a word for which an un-nameable action was a cue.
Therefore, two ‘appropriateness’ conditions were cre-
ated: (1) words and matching pseudowords were pre-
ceded by an appropriate cue; (2) words and matching
pseudowords were preceded by an inappropriate cue. In
fact, a testable prediction is that pseudowords should be
more likely to be judged as real words in Condition 1
than in Condition 2, where no direct priming could
occur.
In this way, the two variables nameability and appro-
priateness are orthogonal: all the cues considered are
nameable, and used in the two conditions once as appro-
priate and the other as inappropriate cues.
Second, hand actions and corresponding hand action
words were tested against images and corresponding
vision words, to address also the perceptual half of the
sensorimotor domain. An additional reason for the
introduction of vision words was the observation that in
Experiment 1 reaction times didn’t seem to capture the
more subtle distinction between hand actions and gen-
eral actions.
Finally, the symbols used in Experiment 1 to prompt
action were substituted by video-clips of performed
actions, to make them comparable with the images used
as prompts for vision words. Also, in this way, the
unnecessary layer of symbol interpretation was elimi-
nated, rendering the experiment more direct and easier
for the subjects.
On the basis of Pulvermüller’s hypothesis, there
should be a selective inXuence of observed movements
on the recognition of action words describing the same
movements, in contrast to both vision words and
pseudowords, due to the simultaneous activation ofoverlapping cell assemblies. Similarly, there should be a
selective inXuence of visual images on vision words,
compared to action words and pseudowords. Again, the
expected eVect should be detectable with behavioural
measures, such as recorded reaction times (RTs) and
response accuracy during a lexical decision task. Implicit
in the design of the experiment is the assumption that
viewing actions will activate motor neurons involved in
carrying out the actions (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998).
Two hypotheses were tested. First that observed
hand movements (in the form of brief video-clips)
would have a selective inXuence on reaction times/
errors at the lexical decision for words describing
actions performed by hand, as opposed to vision words
and pseudowords. This prediction rests on the idea that
an action would activate the same, ‘mirror’ neurons,
regardless of the fact that it is performed or observed
(Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998). Second, the ‘appropriate-
ness’ of the cue would also inXuence the performance,
enhancing RTs, and/or accuracy as a function of seman-
tic priming. SpeciWcally, more positive errors should
emerge from the subjects’ performance when pseudo-
words are preceded by the appropriate cue, compared
to inappropriate cues.
7. Procedure
Seventeen native English speakers performed lexical
decisions on visually presented words and matched
pseudowords (a global set of 48 stimuli, reported in
Appendix B), of which: 32 English words matching for
length (four and Wve letters evenly distributed among
conditions) and frequency (from Leech & Rayson, 2001),
and 16 pseudowords (PW) matching for length, phono-
logically legal, and derived from 16 of the actual words
changing only one character (e.g., blue ! ‘blee’). Of The
32 actual words, 16 were verbs strongly associated with
action performable with one’s hand (or hand action
words, HAW; e.g., pull, push, etc.), and 16 were nouns/
adjectives describing visual features (vision words, VW:
e.g., blue, dark, etc.).
Preceding each word, one of 16 visual cues
appeared inside a rectangle at the centre of a white
computer screen. Visual cues were of two diVerent
types: eight video clips of recorded hand actions, act-
ing as proper cues for the linked hand action words;
eight visual images (of both objects and non-objects),
acting as proper cues for the linked hand action
words.
Each cue lasted on the screen for 1200 ms, indepen-
dently from the category to which it belonged, and was
immediately followed by the appearance of one of the
three linked words (a HAW, a VW, or a PW; black letters on
a white background) in place of the image. Subjects had
to decide as fast and accurately as possible, whether the
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hand, respectively, on the left or the right mouse button.
An intervening stimulus, in the form of a black rectangle
appearing at the centre of the screen, was presented after
each lexical decision. To proceed, the space bar had to be
pressed. This way, subjects could adapt the task comple-
tion at their own pace. Each subject was presented once
with the whole block of 48 words, one at a time, and in
random order.
Reaction times were recorded from the appearance of
the word on the screen to the response. A record was
kept also for correct and incorrect answers.
The two independent variables, respectively, type of
word, with three levels (HAW, VW, and PW) and type of cue,
with two levels (action vs. image and proper vs. improper
cue) were both within subjects. A balanced 3 £ 2 design
resulted with a total of six combined conditions. Reaction
times and errors for the diVerent levels of the two inde-
pendent variables were analysed using a 3 (word type) £2
(cue type) ANOVA for repeated measures.
8. Results
8.1. Reaction Times
Reaction times for the lexical decision task for each
participant on each trial were recorded. The mean RTs
for the three types of word and the two kinds of cue
(action vs. image) are displayed in Fig. 5.
Carrying out an analysis of variance for repeated
measures, the main eVect for type of word
(F (2, 32) D 29.455, p < .01) was signiWcant. According to
the Bonferroni test, the source of the signiWcant diVer-
ence was the diVerence between real words and pseudo-
words. The main eVect for type of cue and the
Fig. 5. Reaction times recorded by type of cue (action vs. image) and
word type in Experiment 2.interaction between type of word and type of cue were
not signiWcant. Pseudowords always required the highest
RTs, regardless of the kind of cue.
The mean RTs for the three types of word and the
two kinds of cue (appropriate vs. inappropriate) are dis-
played in Fig. 6.
The analysis of variance produced a signiWcant main
eVect for type of cue (F (1,16) D 7.382, p < .05). The inap-
propriate cue was related to slower reaction times. The
main eVect for type of word (F (2,32) D 28.701, p < .05)
was also signiWcant. Again, pseudowords required the
slowest reaction times. The interaction between type of
word and type of action was not signiWcant.
8.2. Errors
The percentage of errors for the lexical decision task
for each participant on each trial was recorded. The
error percentages for the three types of word and the two
kinds of cue (appropriate vs. inappropriate) are shown in
Fig. 7.
From the analysis of variance, the main eVect for type
of word was found to be signiWcant (F (2, 30) D 8.730,
p < .01): many more errors were made for pseudowords
than actual words. The quadratic component of the
interaction between the kind of word and the kind of cue
(F (2, 30) D 3.824, p < .05) was also signiWcant with the
highest percentage of errors for pseudowords in the
appropriate condition.
The error percentages for the three types of word and
the two kinds of cue (action vs. image) are shown in Fig. 8.
The analysis of variance produced a signiWcant main
eVect for type of word (F (2, 32) D 7.667, p < .01): many
more errors were made for pseudowords than actual
words. The main eVect for type of cue (action vs. image)
was not signiWcant (F (1,16) D 0.845, p > .5).
Fig. 6. Reaction times recorded by type of cue (appropriate vs. inap-
propriate) and word type in Experiment 2.
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9.1. Reaction times
Reaction times, once again, seemed to capture only
the well-documented diVerence between actual words
and pseudowords, while contrary to the Wrst hypothesis
no signiWcant diVerence was found between the reaction
times for the two diVerent types of actual words (action
vs. image). The RTs globally failed to reXect results from
functional neuro-imaging studies. However, reaction
times were consistently slower for any kind of word
when preceded by inappropriate cues as opposed to
appropriate cues. Therefore, inappropriate cues seem to
impede lexical decision.
Fig. 7. Percentage of errors in Experiment 2 for HAW, VW, and PW
presented, respectively, after an appropriate and an inappropriate cue.
Fig. 8. Percentage of errors in Experiment 2 for HAW, VW, and PW
presented, respectively, after an action and an image as cues.9.2. Errors
The pattern emerging in subjects’ errors is more inter-
esting: the error percentage for pseudowords is much
higher in the appropriate condition, compared to the inap-
propriate condition. Pseudowords seem more likely to be
misjudged as real words when ‘appropriately’ cued by an
action/image. Indeed, subjects were more likely to judge
the pseudoword as a real word when the pseudoword was
preceded by an image/action describable with the word
from which it was derived (for example, press! ‘presh’).
This result provides stronger evidence in support of
the outcome of Experiment 1, since Experiment 2, clearly
distinguished between the variables ‘nameability’ and
‘appropriateness.’
Interestingly, the same pattern of errors emerging for
both performed and observed actions lends support to
the existence of mirror neurons in humans (Rizzolatti &
Arbib, 1998).
Taken together, the two experiments provide support
for the proposal that performed/observed movements, and
visual images may be direct partial primes for words with
strong action and vision associations, respectively. How-
ever, as the actions presented were all nameable it could still
be possible to resort to the classical explanation of priming
arising from the movements being named, with the name
then acting as a prime. This argument is less tenable in the
case of the visual images, since the subject could not know
in advance which feature of the image would be referred to
by the following word. Furthermore, images and actions
did not diVer signiWcantly in terms of the number of lexical
decision errors on the target words/pseudowords.
These results, without entirely ruling out the classi-
cal view on priming, suggest the possibility of a
broader account of priming eVects in terms of cell
assemblies. From this perspective, a symbol (e.g., word
or pseudoword) is just one of a number of sources of
activation that can lead to the ignition of a cell assem-
bly associated with a given concept.
Appendix A
List of the 48 four-letter strings used in Experiment 1
Hand action words General action words Pseudowords
pull rise pule
push feed pesh
drop ride brop
grab blow gral
shut race shub
wave Xow wame
stir leap snir
rest spin relt
chop grow rive
snap Wll ferd
toss grin nide
pick step blon
fold lean ract
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List of the 48 four-letter strings used in Experiment 2
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